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DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND THE OPERATING
LOSS CARRY-OVER
The enactment of statutes permitting operating profit to be offset
against prior operating losses' created a new area of contention be-
tween corporate taxpayers and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The conflict initially arose when a profit-making corporation acquired
a loss corporation for the principal purpose2 of taking "tax advantage"
of that loss. For a considerable period of time profit-making taxpayers
were successful in utilizing these so-called "upstream mergers."3 How-
ever, when the Treasury Department, fortified with newly-enacted
statutes and recent court decisions, began to take a dim view of these
mergers, more astute taxpayers conceived a new approach known as
the "downstream merger.' '4 Under this new approach the loss corpora-
tion obtains control5 of the profit-making corporation. Cases involv-
ing the downstream merger are now beginning to reach the appellate
courts; the first of these was Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson.6
Before considering the downstream merger, it would be advisable
to review the law as it developed with reference to upstream mergers.
Prior to 1943 and the passage of section 129 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, the taxpayer enjoyed almost complete freedom in pur-
chasing another's business losses to offset his own business profits.7
However, under section 129, the Commissioner can wholly or par-
tially deny any benefit of a deduction to a taxpayer who is (i) a per-
son acquiring control8 of a corporation, or (2) a corporation acquiring
the property of another corporation in a tax-free transaction.9 Section
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 26, 53 Stat. 18 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172).2Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129, added by ch. 63, 58 Stat. 47 (1944) (now Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 269).
:"Upstream merger" is used in a generic sense and includes acquisitions by
purchase, consolidation, or technical merger.
'The terms "upstream" and "downstream" merger were developed as shorthand
expressions by taxation practitioners.
GThe word "control" as used in § 269 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 was defined
as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 per cent. of the total combined
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 per cent. of the total shares
of all classes of stock in the corporation." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129, added by
ch. 63, 58 Stat. 47 (1947) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269).
0264 F.2d 713 (5 th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959).
-See, e.g., Moline Property, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), in which
a corporation and its single stockholder enjoyed complete individuality for taxation
purposes.
"See note 5 supra.
"For § 129 to be applicable, the acquisition by a person or corporation had to
be made after October 8, 194o.
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129 only applies, though, when the principal purpose of such an
acquisition is to evade or avoid federal income taxes by securing a
benefit which the taxpayer would not otherwise have enjoyed.' 0 Proof
of such a purpose was the primary difficulty confronting the Com-
missioner under the 1939 Code." In the 1948 case of Alprosa Watch
Corp.,' 2 the Tax Court took much of the sting out of section 129,
even though the section was inapplicable.' 3 The Tax Court indicated
that section 129 did not apply when a corporation is using its own loss,
regardless of the presence or absence of tax avoidance as a motive. The
Commissioner successfully overcame this dictum in 1955 when section
129 was applied for the first time in American Pipe & Steel Corp. v.
Commissioner.14 In that case the appellant was not permitted to off-
set his profits with a loss acquired by the purchase of a real estate
corporation owning lots with a book value of $43o,ooo and a present
market value of only $25,ooo. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Coastal
Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner15 gave even more significant support
for the position of the Commissioner, for it was therein held that sec-
tion 129 applied when a parent corporation created a subsidiary by
transfering assets to it. In this decision, the court disallowed a $25,ooo
surtax exemption for each subsidiary created 16 because the real tax
"'Butler, Purchase and Use of Loss Corporations Under 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, 9 U. So. Cal. 1957 Tax Inst. 121, 123.
"Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3 d Cir. 1952); J. E. Dil-
worth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951); WAGE Inc., 19 T.C. 249
(1952) (also failing to consider that the corporations involved were already controlled
by the same persons before their merger); Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951);
Berland, Inc., 16 T.C. 182 (1951); A. B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (195o); Com-
modores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948).
1211 T.C. 240 (1948). This case involved the Esspi Glove Corporation, which
was in the business of manufacturing and selling gloves. On June 15, 1943, all of
the stock of Esspi was purchased by two new stockholders, its name was changed to
Aiprosa Watch Corporation, its place of business was moved, and the nature of the
business was changed to the buying and selling of jewelry. It was held that Alprosa
was a single taxable entity after the merger and could apply the operating losses
of Esspi to offset its own operating gains, thereby effecting an excess profits tax
saving.
13The effective date of § 129 was January 1, 1943. Therefore, acquisitions by per-
sons or corporations must affect taxable years after this date in order to make the
section applicable. This was not the case in Alprosa.
2'243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1957), affirming 25 T.C. 351 (1955). This case was decided
under the 1939 Code because the transaction took place prior to the effective date of
the 1954 Code.
1n72 4 2 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 1304 (1955). For a discussion of
this case see 43 Va. L. Rev. 1134 (1957). Accord, Revell, Inc. v. Riddell, 273 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1959); Aldon Homes, Inc. S3 T.C. 582 (1959).
"The $25,ooo surtax exemption was originally provided for by the Revenue
Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 13(a)(2), 52 Stat. 447 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1(e)).
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benefit accrued to the parent as the sole owner of the subsidiary's stock.
The Commissioner's position was further strengthened by the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954.17 While section 269 of the 1954 Code
substantially reenacts section 129, it adds a subsection, (c). This new
subsection transfers to the taxpayer the burden of proving that his
principal purpose in acquiring a loss corporation is not to evade or
avoid income taxes when the amount the acquirer pays for such corp-
oration is "substantially disproportionate" 8 to the book value of the
assets he acquires.' 9 This presumption in favor of the Commissioner
is rebuttable, however, by something less than "a clear preponderance
of the evidence. '20 Another addition to the 1954 Code, section 381,
provides "for the continued use of corporate losses by a successor
corporation which results either (1) by reason of the liquidation of a
wholly-owned subsidiary corporation, 2' or (2) by reason of a reorgani-
zation in the form of a merger or acquisition 2 of assets in exchange
for stock."23 However, this section is subject to the limitations of
section 382. Subsection (a) provides that the entire loss carryover is
denied the taxpayer if two conditions are present at the end of the
taxable year: (i) there has been a substantial change in the ownership 2
'"The entire 1954 Code can be found in 26 U.S.C. (1958).
""Substantially disproportionate" means substantially less. S. Rep. No. 1622,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1954).
"It is probable that Congress did not think that § 269(c) of the 1954 Code
would impede the expansion of business, because in this period of inflation market
value seldom bears a "substantially proportionate" relation to book value.
'S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1954)-
"For the purpose of § 381 of the 1954 Code, liquidations of wholly owned sub-
sidiary corporations are defined by § 332 (except for the so-called Kimball-Diamond
liquidations which are defined by and subject to the limitations of § 334(b)).
-1'Such acquisitions and mergers are described in clauses A, C, D and F, of §
368(a)(i) of the 1954 Code. But note that mergers under § 368(a)(i)(B), known as
Clause B mergers, are not subject to § 382(b) by virtue of § 382(b)(3). The scope of
this article does not include a discussion of the various types of mergers, but see 12
J. Taxation 8 (Jan. 196o).
"Butler, Purchase and Use of Loss Corporations Under 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, 9 U. So. Cal. 1957 Tax Inst. 121, 125. Since the operating loss carryover only
applies to the two succeeding taxable years, the acquiring corporate taxpayer should
be careful that its taxable year coincides with that of the acquired corporation,
lest a short taxable year (the period between the ending of the acquiring and
acquired taxpayer's taxable years) be created with a waste of a substantial part of
the gain sought. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3 81(b)(i).
!"There has been a substantial change in ownership when "as a result of the
purchase or redemption of stock, the ten largest stockholders of the corporation own
at the end of the taxable year at least 5o percentage points more of its stock than
they had owned at the beginning of the taxable year in question or at the beginning
of the prior taxable year...." Winton, Loss Corporations and arry-Overs, 34 Taxes
549 (1956).
"An increase of 5o percentage points does not mean the same as a 5o percent
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of the corporation, and (2) there has been a substantial change in the
nature of the trade or business after such change in control.2 5 Sub-
section (b) of section 382 authorizes the Commissioner, when the stock-
holders of the acquired corporation have received less than 20 per
cent of the stock of the acquiring corporation after the merger, to dis-
allow so much of the loss carryover as is proportionate to the per-
centage by which the stock given to the stockholders of the acquired
corporation is less than the required 20 per cent.2 6 In considering sec-
tion 382 before its passage, the Senate Finance Committee stated:
"If a limitation in this section applies to a net operating loss
carryover, section 269, relating to acquisitions made to evade
or avoid income tax, shall not also be applied to such net operat-
ing loss carryover. However, the fact that a limitation under
this section does not apply shall have no effect upon whether
section 269 applies." 27
In view of this language, it has been suggested 2s that the taxpayer
should voluntarily forego a small portion of the loss carryover by
giving the stockholders of the acquired corporation slightly less than
the prescribed 2o per cent of the stock of the acquiring corporation,20
in order to avoid the risk of losing all of the loss carryover through
the application of section 269.
Thus far the problems considered have involved "upstream merg-
ers," a generic term for situations in which a profitable corporation
acquires control of a loss corporation. The question remains as to the
increase. A stockholder who owns 4 percent of the fair market value of the out-
standing stock and who increases his ownership to 6 percent has had a 50 percent
increase in ownership but only a 2 percentage point increase." 12 J. Taxation 9
n.i (Jan. ig6o).
n"This prohibition against change of business is generally considered as
implying that the loss corporation must be an active business, thereby excluding
mere shell corporations." Winton, Loss Corporations and Carry-Overs, 34 Taxes
549, 553 (1956). See American Well & Prospecting Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 931
(3d Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 58-9, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. i9o. Penton v. Commissioner, 259
F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1958), and Hutchens Metal Products, Inc. v. Bookwalter, 174 F.
Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1959), which seem to indicate that a reasonable time may
elapse after cessation of the business operations of one company and the resump-
tion of them by another company without loss of carryover. Time to negotiate sale
of the business would be an example of such a reasonable time.
"E.g., if only 19% of the acquiring corporation is given to the previous stock-
holders of the acquired corporation, only 95% of the loss of the acquired corpora-
tion may be carried over. (19/20 X 1oo%--95%).
7S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 228, 284 (1954).
nWinton, Loss Corporations and Carry-Overs, 34 Taxes 549, 554 (1956).
"But see, Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. United States, 270 F.ad 27 (9th Cir. 1959),
which held that when Congress has amended a statute to cover a loophole, the fact
that an addition has been required is proof that the prior statute should be given
a different construction.
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tax consequences when a loss corporation acquires the assets of a
gain corporation, and, in its own name, engages only in the activities
of the profit-making business. Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson30 is a
recent case involving such a so-called downstream merger.
In Mill Ridge, the taxpayer suffered considerable operating losses
in mining and selling coal during the taxable years 1948 through
1953. In December of 1953 the Bunker Oil Company was formed to
transport oil pursuant to previously obtained contracts. Subsequently,
Bunker Oil purchased all the stock of the Mill Ridge Coal Company,
and in Mill Ridge's name proceeded to transport oil under Bunker's
contracts. During 1954 the Bunker Oil Company was dissolved. This
action, together with a statement by one of the new stockholders that
the principal purpose for acquiring Mill Ridge was to obtain the
benefit of its earlier losses, showed that Bunker was never more than
a shell corporation.31 The Commissioner, relying on section 129,32
disallowed the loss carryover. This ruling was sustained by the District
Court,33 which, instead of using section 129, based its decision on
Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler,34 a case which held that in order for
any offset to be allowed, the profit and loss must both result from
substantially the same business. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision in Mill Ridge on a three-
fold basis: (i) that section 129 was applicable, (2) that the construction
given to Libson was correct, and (3) that the taxpayer's actions ran
contrary to the spirit of the law.
In holding that section 129 was applicable and that the taxpayer
was "securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance
which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy,"35 the
Court of Appeals stretched the wording of section 129, for it was in
effect predicting the future of Mill Ridge. The editors of a leading
tax periodical, in voicing opposition to this type of prognostication,
said that, "at the time of an acquisition, it cannot be stated absolute-
ly that the acquiring corporations 'would not' enjoy the benefit of its
31264 F.2d 713 (5 th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (x95o).
'A shell or dummy corporation is a corporation which exists in name only and
carries on no functions as a corporate entity.
"-The 1939 Code was applied because the transaction had taken place prior to the
promulgation of the 1954 Code.
nMill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (58-1 U.S.
Tax Cas.) 9489 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 28, 1958).
"353 U.S. 382 (1957)-
=Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129, added by ch. 63, 58 Stat. 47 (1944) (now Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 269).
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own loss." At most it can be said that, "it 'might not' enjoy the bene-
fits of its operating loss.
'"36
In the Libson case,3 7 used as a basis for the decision of both the
District Court and Court of Appeals in Mill Ridge, seventeen sep-
arate corporations were merged to take advantage of pre-merger losses
sustained by three of the corporations. Mr. Justice Burton, speaking
for the majority of the Supreme Court, specifically stated that the
court did not pass on situations3s in which "a single corporate tax-
payer changed the character of its business and the taxable income
of one of its enterprises was reduced by the deductions or credits
of another."3 9 Since the Mill Ridge Coal Company was a single
corporate taxpayer, the Court of Appeals in Mill Ridge either over-
looked the meaning of this Supreme Court statement while recog-
nizing its existence, or decided such a single corporate taxpayer would
nevertheless have lost in the Libson case had the Supreme Court de-
cided the issue.40 In cases arising after Libson, but before Mill Ridge,
the Tax Court, when squarely faced with the same issue, decided in
favor of the taxpayer.41 One authority has said of Mill Ridge that
"the real dynamite is in the Fifth Circuit's reliance on Libson.4 2 While
the case involved change of ownership, the logic covers a loss carry-
over by the same taxable entity from its old business to a new busi-
ness operation. If this is applied under the 1954 Code, it would de-
stroy the implied protection given an operating loss carryover (Sec.
382) where either the business or the ownership of the corporation is
unchanged." 4
3
As a final basis for its decision in Mill Ridge, the Court of Appeals
8 Tax Fortnighter 319 (1959).
353 U.S. 382 (1957)-
"Id. at 39o n.9. "We do not pass on situations like those presented in Northway
Securities v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A.; Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner, i I T.C.
24o; A. B. & Container Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 842; W A G E, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 19 T.C. 249."
'353 U.S. at 39o. Libson disallowed the carryover of the premerger losses be-
cause such losses are only available to the business (taxpayer) sustaining such losses.
The court held that the merged corporation was not such a taxpayer.
40264 F.2d at 717.
"British Motor Car Distrib., Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1959); The T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C.
879 (1957). But see Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th
Cir. 1957). See also James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 3o6 (D. Minn.
1959).
"-The Internal Revenue Service expressed its dissatisfaction with the holding
of Libson in Rev. Rul. 58-6o3 , 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 147, which stated that the holding
in Libson would not be relied on by the Internal Revenue Service under the 1954
Code as to a merger or any other transaction described in § 381(a).
"32 Research Institute of America, Tax Coordinator, F-67o4 (Recent Develop-
ments, Jan. 196o) 22,022. (This page was deleted on February 15, 1960).
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stated that " the facts are so clear, the purpose and results of the ac-
tions taken are so obviously in conflict with the meaning and intent
of the remedial statute [section 129] appellant invokes that ... the
transaction... is foreign to its spirit and its clearly expressed overall
purpose and intent."4 4 This sweeping assertion that Mill Ridge vio-
lated the spirit of the tax legislation when it acquired Bunker Oil
seems to be a matter of conjecture when viewed in light of modern
business practices and procedures. Enterprises constantly change the
nature of their operations by branching into new fields and withdraw-
ing from others as economic conditions demand, and it cannot be
said as a matter of law that this practice is a violation of congressional
intent. There was legislative recognition of this fact when Congress,
in considering the disallowance of loss carryovers when there is a
change in the nature of the business, required a change in both the
ownership and the nature of the business to deny the loss carryover.
One or the other alone is not sufficient under section 382(a) and (b) of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
In Mill Ridge the court assumed a legislative function by its
strained interpretation of the various code sections. Thus a danger-
ous precedent has been set which may adversely affect one avenue of
future expansion of the economy, for businesses must be unduly cau-
tious, lest they be caught unaware by statutes and decisions which
tend to thwart any advantage that expansion might hold for them.
Congress obviously did not intend to curtail economic expansion in
this manner, and the courts should not frustrate this legislative intent
unless absolutely necessary, and then only in the narrowest exercise
of its judicial powers.
It is submitted that in Mill Ridge and other decisions in this area
the courts have frustrated legislative intent, so that today the loss
carryover will generally be denied the taxpayer both in upstream and
downstream mergers. However, by a careful reading of the statutes,
a strict adherence to subsequent regulations, 45 and a scrupulous in-
vestigation of the case law in the field, the astute taxpayer having a
legitimate business purpose for his acquisition may avoid the disal-
lowance of his loss carryover. "Truly this is a field requiring careful




44264 F.2d at 717.
I'No regulations construing §§ 269, 381, or 382 of the 1954 Code have been pro-
mulgated at this writing.
"Winton, Loss Corporations and Carry-Overs, 34 Taxes 549, 575 (1956).
